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pellate bench, and multiply requests for ordinary and extraordinary
review beyond the capacity of appellate judges to consider them properly.59
HUGH J. BEARD, JR.
Civil Procedure-Specificity in Pleading under North Carolina
Rule 8(a) (1)
A problem now1 facing the North Carolina practitioner desiring
to bring an action is drafting a complaint 2 that will satisfy the require-
ments of rule 8(a) (1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
(NCRCP). The drafter is no longer required to set out "[a] plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action . . . ."4 but
rather is supposed to draft "[a] short and plain statement of the claim
sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the trans-
actions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to
be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... -i
Since the new North Carolina rules are based almost entirely on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure0 (FRCP), from which have de-
veloped a sizable body of case law, the North Carolina pleader could
rapidly determine the standard that he is required to meet in his complaint
were it not for the phrase "sufficiently particular to give the court and
the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
" Id. at 779. The Second Circuit reiterated its limitation of the applicability of
Eisen in Carceres v. International Air Transport Ass'n, Civil Nos. 33433-39 (2d
Cir., Jan. 13, 1970), in which a similar appeal from a negative rul 23(c) (1)
determination was dismissed. Upon the authority of International Pipe, Judge Hays
reluctantly concurred.
'The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the General
Assembly during the 1967 session and were to become effective July 1, 1969. Ch.
954, § 10, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1354. The 1969 session of the General Assembly
postponed the effective date until January 1, 1970. Ch. 895, § 21, [1969] N.C. Sess.
L. -.
Throughout this note, in the interest of simplicity, the pleading alleging a
claim will be called a complaint; the pleading party, plaintiff; and the party attack-
ing the complaint, defendant.
'N.C.R. Civ. P. 1-84, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I (1969). The North Carolina rules
are basically the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; most of the differ-
ences between the two sets of rules are discussed herein.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-122 (1953) (repealed Jan. 1, 1970). This statute was
originally enacted August 18, 1868, as § 93 of the 1868 Code of Civil Procedure.
5 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1-86, 28 U.S.C., app., Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts (1964).
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or occurrences intended to be proved .... ,,7 This language makes federal
precedent construing the specificity requirement of FRCP 8(a) (2)8
inconclusive at best.
In attempting to determine the degree of specificity required by
NCRCP 8(a) (1), the first step must be an analysis of the words used.
It could be argued that the added language is merely surplusage since
the federal rule also purports to give the court and parties notice of the
transaction or occurrence that the plaintiff intends to prove.9 This argu-
ment ignores the simple fact that the drafters did in fact add the language
to the North Carolina rule and must have had some reason in so doing:
their only possible purpose would seem to be requiring a more specific
complaint than is acceptable under the federal rule.1" However, use of
the word "notice" leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff need not be
as specific as was required when "facts" had to be included in the com-
plaint." The "notice" concept, at least under the federal rule, simply
requires describing the event claimed as a wrong with enough particularity
"to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, to allow for
the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show the type of
case brought, so that it may be assigned to the proper form of trial.""
While the aim of the drafters of the North Carolina rules no doubt in-
cluded these same ends, they presumably must be accomplished in a
more specific manner than simply providing "a generalized summary
of the case."' 3 In sum, the complaint required by the new North Carolina
rule need not be as specific as that under the former practice, but must
be to some degree more specific than the federal complaint. The added
degree of specificity is not readily determinable from the language of the
rule itself.
Since the language of NCRCP 8(a) (1) is essentially the same as that
of the New York statute controlling specificity in pleading, Civil Practice
7 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
The federal rule requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .. ."
'Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) ; 2A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.02 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
"
0This conclusion is buttressed by noting that the negligence forms provided
by the NCR are more specific than the corresponding federal forms. See pp. 642-43
& notes 42 & 44 infra.
" Phillips, Pleading-Part I in NORTHi CAROLINA BAR ASSoCIATIoN, INSTITUTE
ON JURISDICTION, JOINDER, AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE V-1, V-15 (1968).
' 2A MooRE 8.13.
18Id. 8.03.
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Law and Rules § 301314 (CPLR), inquiry into the judicial gloss placed
on the latter, at least before 1967, will be fruitful.1 However, there
are three differences between the North Carolina and New York rules
that must be noted.
First, CPLR 3013 requires the plaintiff to include "the material ele-
ments of each cause of action . . . "'0 in his complaint. Because neither
the terms17 nor the judicial interpretation18 of FRCP 8(a) (2) requires
that the "material elements" of the plaintiff's claim be pleaded, it can be
argued that the North Carolina drafters, by leaving this phrase out of
NCRCP 8(a) (1), intended to lean toward the federal result rather than
" N.Y. Cxv. PmRc. LAw § 3013 (McKinney 1963) states:
Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court
and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
or occurrences intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause
of action or defense.
" Although there is no legislative history so indicating, the language of NCRCP
8(a) (1) is probably taken from CPLR 3013. The words "notice of the trans-
actions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences . . . ." appear in
NCRCP 8(a) (1) and NCRCP 15(c) and in both cases this language represents
a change from the corresponding federal rule. The comment following NCRCP 15
states that the new language in that rule is taken from CPLR 3025, the New York
analogue to NCRCP 15 (c). It seems very unlikely that the North Carolina drafters
intended to use the language of a New York rule in NCRCP 15(c) while adopting
language in NCRCP 8(a) (1) identical to that in CPLR 3013 without having
meant to follow it as well. Thus it can be presumed that NCRCP 8(a) (1) is taken
directly from CPLR 3013. Construction of CPLR 3013 by New York courts then
becomes all important since the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that it
would be bound by such interpretation. In Ledford v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
179 N.C. 63, 101 S.E. 533 (1919), in which construction of a North Carolina
procedural statute adopted from New York was in question, the court said that
"'[w]here the legislature enacts a provision taken from a statute of another State
• . . in which the language of the act has received a settled construction, it is
presumed to have intended such provision should be understood and applied in
accordance with that construction.'" Id. at 66, 101 S.E. at 534. See also M'Kinnon
v. M'Lean, 19 N.C. 79, 84 (1836). This rule of statutory interpretation doubtless
would include construction by courts in New York as of the time the North Caro-
lina rules were adopted (1967) and probably should apply to decisions from New
York prior to January 1, 1970.
" N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 3013 (McKinney 1963).
"T See note 8 supra.
"8 A claim under the federal rule will surely be dismissed (with leave to amend)
if a major material element is totally omitted. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.11
(1965). However, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the federal courts will infer
or assume some elements of a claim. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1944); Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951). See also
Siegel, Introducing: A Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 190, 207 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Siegel], in which the writer argues




risk a possible strict interpretation that could be obtained from the
language of CPLR 3013. Even if this was not the intent of the drafters,
there is no reasonable argument that the lack of a "material elements"
requirement demands more specificity under NCRCP 8(a) (1) than
under CPLR 3013.
CPLR 3013 retains the older "cause of action" language rather than
adopting the federal term "claim for relief" as was done in the North
Carolina rules. This variation in terms probably makes no difference in
comparing the two rules since both the comments to the North Carolina
rules19 and commentators on those of New York recognize that "the
difference between 'cause of action' and 'claim for relief' is more semantic
than real."' 20 If any difference in result could accrue from the difference
in terminology, it would again seem that CPLR 3013, by retaining the
"cause of action" language, would require more specificity than the
more modern terminology "claim for relief" in NCRCP 8(a) (1).
Finally, CPLR 3026 provides that "[p]leadings shall be liberally
construed. Defects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is
not prejudiced."2 Since this rule has been literally applied in New York
to demand that defendant must show prejudice2 2 to a substantial right
before he can successfully attack a complaint,' the New York judge has
a more clearly-defined mandate upon which he can rely in denying a motion
to dismiss than does his North Carolina counterpart. The closest thing
to CPLR 3026 in the North Carolina rules is rule 8(f), which states that
"[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."'
Essentially the same result as that reached by the New York courts under
CPLR 3026 should be reached by the North Carolina courts under
NCRCP 8(f). The language of FRCP 8(f)," which is identical to
NCRCP 8(f), was considered in DeLoach v. Crowley's, Inc.,26 and the
10 N.C.R. Civ. P. 8, comment (a)(2).
"Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1431, 1439 (1960);
Siegel 206."N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 3026 (McKinney 1963).
The New York courts find the defendant to be prejudiced when the complaint
fails to give him sufficient notice of the historical facts or the theory relied upon
to enable him to intelligently answer and proceed with discovery. E.g., Meltzer v.
Klien, 29 App. Div. 2d 548, -, 285 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1967) ; Household Coal &
Oil Distrib., Inc. v. Sage, 57 Misc. 2d 428, -, 292 N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. City 1968).
" Foley v. D'Agostino, 12 App. Div. 2d 60, -, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 (1964).
"N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(f).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
" 128 F.2d 3,78 (5th Cir. 1942). This case is cited in the comment to N.C.R.
Civ. P. 12 as an example of the application of that rule in the federal courts.
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court said, "[j]ust what this means is not clear, but it excludes requiring
technical exactness, or the making of refined inferences against the pleader,
and requires an effort to fairly understand what he attempts to set forth."'2 7
Although some commentators feared that New York courts could not
reach even an approximation of the federal result under CPLR 3013 be-
cause of the inclusion of the phrase "sufficiently particular,"2 8 these mis-
givings soon proved groundless. The trend toward liberal interpretation of
pleadings under CPLR 3013 began with Hewitt v. Maass2 0 in which the
court said:
The requirement now is "Statements ... sufficiently particular to give
the court and the parties notice. . . ." (CPLR § 3013). This change
is reflective of the decisional trend previously and points to not only
less formalized pleadings but also to the elimination of obscure dis-
tinctions inherent in words such as "conclusions," "ultimate (and
other kinds of) facts," and similar others. These classifications and
their status and effect as or in pleadings have been eliminated. Now,
if notice, or literally comprehension, can be had from a pleading the
method of attaining the communicable pattern becomes secondary. 0
The Appellate Division rapidly followed with the decision in Foley
v. D'Agostino,3 1 which has become the standard for measuring sufficiency
of pleadings in New York."' The complaint in Foley, which had been
dismissed by the trial court, consisted of three causes of action alleging
breach of fiduciary obligations and unfair competition by half of the
stockholders and the officers of a family corporation. Reversing the dis-
missal below, the Appellate Division stated its position in the following
manner: .t I
Upon a Rule 3211 (a) (7)3 motion to dismiss a cause of action .
we look to the substance rather than to the form. Such a motion is
27 128 F.2d at 380.
21 Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLum. L. REv. 435, 450
(1958); Siegel 198-202." 41 Misc. 2d 894, 246 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
30 Id. at -, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
"1 12 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964).
2 The New York courts apparently view Foley and CPLR 3013 as synonomous
in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. See, e.g.,
Buljanovic v. Grace Lines, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 614, 295 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1968);
Richardson v. Coy, 28 App. Div. 2d 640, 280 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1967); Pope v.
Zeckendorf Hotels Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 647, 252 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1964); In-
fusino v. Pelnik, 45 Misc. 2d 333, 256 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3211 (a) (7) (McKinney 1963) is the New York ana-
logue of N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) (footnote added).
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solely directed to the inquiry of whether or not the pleading, considered
as a whole, "fails to state a cause of action." Looseness, verbosity and
excursiveness, must be overlooked on such a motion, if any cause of
action can be spelled out from the four corners of the pleading. 4
The proper promotion of the general CPLR objective requires
more than mere token observance of or lip service to its mandate for
liberal construction of the pleadings. To achieve such objective, we
must literally apply the mandate as directed and thus make the test
of prejudice one of primary importance. Thereby, we would in-
variably disregard pleading irregularities, defects, or omissions which
are not such as to reasonably mislead one as to the identity of the
transactions or occurrences sought to be litigated or as to the nature
and elements of the alleged cause of action or defense.8 5
The court then considered the complaint in question and found that even
though the first cause of action did not show with specificity the manner
and extent of the competition, or to what extent the family corporation
had been or would be damaged, the complaint nonetheless gave "notice
of the plaintiffs' claims ... and of the elements of plaintiffs' alleged cause
of action; and furthermore, the defendants [were not] prejudiced in any
manner by the alleged deficiencies therein." 6
Having established a liberal pleading rule, the New York courts then
continued the trend by completely abandoning the "theory of the plead-
ings" standard in Lane v. Mercury Record Corp.,7 an action for an
accounting of royalties. On a motion to dismiss, the trial court found
that the equitable cause of action was sufficiently stated, and the defendant
appealed. The Appellate Division held that no equitable cause of action
was stated, but affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss on the ground
that a legal cause of action for breach of contract appeared in the com-
" 12 App. Div. 2d at -, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
35 Id. at - 248 N.Y.S.2d at 127.TM Id. at -, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 129. Complaints will, however, be dismissed if
they fail to meet the standard of Foley. E.g., Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. John
David, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 827, 259 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965) (allegations that
defendant "wrongfully" and "maliciously" induced another to breach a contract
are insufficient); Shapolsky v. Shapolsky, 22 App. Div. 2d 91, 253 N.Y.S.2d 816
(1964) (complaint jumbled actions in individual and representative capacities,
demanded accounting without pleading the basis therefor, demanded delivery of
stock certificates without pleading entitlement). See also Loudin v. Mohawk
Airlines, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 447, 260 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1965) (complaint alleging
malicious interference with right to employment and conspiracy dismissed for
failure to state "evidentiary facts" sufficient to support the claim).
" 21 App. Div. 2d 602, 252 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1964).
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plaint. Lane was affirmed unanimously by the Court of Appeals in a one
line memorandum opinion,3" and the "theory of the pleadings" rule dis-
appeared from New York practice. 9 Thus, although the plaintiff always
should and usually will clearly outline the theory he has selected and be
correct in his selection, the court may not grant a motion to dismiss if
any theory of recovery can be found in the pleading, regardless of the relief
requested.40
The dire predictions precipitated by the additional language in
CPLR 3013 not found in the federal rules were averted by early and
strong judicial action. Before an intent to reach the same or a more liberal
result can be ascribed to the drafters of the North Carolina rules, however,
additional features of those rules must be considered. In addition to the
language of rule 8(a) (1), the North Carolina drafters retained pre-
complaint discovery 41 from the former practice and included specifications
of negligent acts in the official forms42 accompanying the new rules.
The comments to the rules give no clue why the drafters thought that
the retention of pre-complaint discovery in NCRCP 27(b) was necessary
or desirable. Whatever the drafters intended, one possible effect of this
provision is that a defendant attacking a complaint for insufficiency can
argue that plaintiff had an opportunity through use of rule 27 (b) to obtain
enough information to plead in detail and that, having failed to take ad-
vantage of this provision, he should be dismissed without leave to amend,
particularly when plaintiff asserts that he cannot amend without discovery.
8 Lane v. Mercury Record Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 889, 233 N.E.2d 35, 276 N.Y.S.2d
626 (1966).
" In a case such as Lane, if the parties have not previously sought a jury
trial, CPLR 4103 allows the adverse party to request a jury when the issues appear.
NCRCP 38 allows demand for jury trial of right until ten days after the service
of the last pleading directed to the issue. Thus, if the court finds a legal issue
when construing the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss, the defendant will
not have answered; and, assuming the complaint is not dismissed, the plaintiff
still has until ten days after the defendant's answer to demand jury trial. See 5
MooRE 7 38.39[2].
"E.g., Buljanovic v. Grace Lines, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 614, 295 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1968) (complaint alleging unseaworthiness should not have been dismissed by
trial court in any case because it stated a cause of action for failure to provide a
safe place to work); Richardson v. Coy, 28 App. Div. 2d 640, -, 280 N.Y.S.2d
623, 624 (1967); Sheehan v. Amity Estates, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 594, 275
N.Y.S.2d 644 (1966) (allegation of fraud insufficient, but cause of action stated
in unilateral mistake); Barrick v. Barrick, 24 App. Div. 2d 895, 264 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1965) (complaint requesting reformation insufficient, but cause of action stated
in breach of contract).
"4 Ch. 760, § 1, [1951] N.C. Sess. L. 734-41. (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-568.1 to
-568.27, repealed Jan. 1, 1970).
' N.C.R. Civ. P. 84, forms (3) & (4).
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If this argument is attempted, the courts should immediately reject it
because (1) if the complaint is interpreted liberally, there is no need for
pre-complaint discovery; (2) pre-complaint discovery is more awkward
than pre-trial discovery;4 and (3) pre-trial discovery will satisfy any
demand of defendant for facts without creating problems concerning
statutes of limitations or the relation-back theory, which often result from
dismissal and amendment.
The North Carolina drafters also altered the complaints for negligence
from the conclusory style of the federal44 and New York45 forms to forms
complete with specifications of negligent acts. Since NCRCP 8446 states
not only that the forms provided are sufficient, but are also guides to the
simplicity and brevity intended in the rules, it may be, as one commentator
suggests, that specific, factual complaints are limited to situations involving
negligence in operation of autmobiles.4 7  It seems more plausible to
assume that North Carolina forms (3) and (4) will become the standard
and that the other forms will be limited to the particular claim for relief
that they illustrate.4 In any event, the drafters have indicated that at
least in some cases the North Carolina rules require a more specific com-
plaint than the rules of either federal or New York procedure.49
Even granting, however, that more specific complaints are required in
certain cases under the new rules, the North Carolina courts should still
be very reluctant to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under rule 12(b) (6). 50 The 12(b) (6)
motion-unlike a demurrer-when sustained is considered an adjudication
on the merits and the plaintiff's claim, if leave to amend is requested
and denied, is res judicata.51 This harsh result can be defended only if
"Compare N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(a) with N.C.R. Civ. P. 27(b).
"FED. R. Civ. P. forms 9 & 10.
2 McKINNEY's FORMS, CIVIL PRACTICE LAw & RULEs §§ 4:48, 4:49 (Supp.
1969).
,oN.C.R. Civ. P. 84.
"Sizemore, Iiztroduction in NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSocIATIoN FOUNDATION,
INSTITUTE ON JURISDICTION, JOINDER AND PLEADING UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S
NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE I-1, 1-13 (1968).
"' Since all the forms provided are copies of common law common counts except
forms (3) and (4), it would appear that when the drafters had the opportunity to
create their own forms, they opted for specificity.
"See N.C.R. Civ. P. 8, comment (a)(3).
This motion is analogous to a demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. In application it is similar to the demurrer to a state-
ment of a defective cause of action. See N.C.R. Cxv. P. 12, comment.
" The demurrer to a statement of a defective cause of action, when sustained,
made plaintiff's claim res judicata. Davis v. Anderson Indus, 266 N.C. 610, 146
1970]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the procedural system insures the plaintiff that he will not be dismissed
when there is any possibility whatsoever that he can recover.52 The motion
should only be granted when, as in the federal system, an affirmative
defense appears on the face of the complaint,"s the complaint itself nega-
tives any right to recover," or it is clear beyond doubt that "the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him
to relief."55 Dismissal at the pleading stage, at least dismissal without
leave to amend, for any other reason does not give the plaintiff adequate
assurance that he will be afforded an opportunity to avoid the effect of
res judicata.
That this analysis is correct can be seen by exploring the alternatives
and their effects on the parties. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the
defendant still has three options open to him: he may answer and take
discovery ;56 he may answer, take discovery and move for summary judg-
ment ;57 or, assuming that he includes the motion with his motion to
dismiss, he may move for a more definite statement.5" If defendant chooses
the first course, he has presumably gathered all the information needed
for trial preparation from discovery and has in no way been injured.
If it appears from the information obtained in discovery that plaintiff
does not have a valid claim under any state of the facts, defendant can
move for summary judgment and should prevail.5 In this situation
S.E.2d 817 (1966); 1 MCINTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1189 & n.5.7 (Supp. 1969). The demurrer to a defective statement of a good
cause of action generally had no such effect. Id. § 1200 (2d ed. 1956) & § 1200
(Supp. 1969). Under the federal rules, the granting of a 12(b) (6) motion always
results in the application of res judicata. Arrowsmith v. U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219,
221 (2d Cir. 1963).
1 See Louis, The Sufficiency of a Complaint, Res Jiedicata, and the Statute of
Limitations-A Study Occasioned by Recent Changes in the North Carolina Code,
45 N.C.L. REv. 659, 673 (1967).
" L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 109 F.2d 493 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S.
295 (1940) (plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue evident on the face of the com-
plaint).
" Leggett v. Montgomery Ward, 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1949) (in an action
for malicious prosecution, plaintiff pleaded that probable cause was found).
" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
" N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a) (1) & Article 5, Depositions and Discovery.
r7 N.C.R. Civ. P. 56. This motion may be made at any time.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e).
Summary judgment is the device for determining whether there is any
genuine issue as to a material fact. 6 MooRE 56.04. If plaintiff stated con-
clusory allegations in his complaint, discovery should inform defendant whether
plaintiff has facts to support the conclusions. Obviously, a better determination as
to the merits can be made following discovery than can be made at the pleading
stage. Judgment on the pleadings is also available under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(c);
for the relationship of this rule to summary judgement see 6 MOORE 1 56.09.
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defendant has not been prejudiced except to the extent of writing and
mailing interrogatories or taking depositions; plaintiff has had an oppor-
tunity to establish the factual validity of his claim; and if the claim fails
here, it can properly be dismissed on the merits.6" It should be noted that
summary judgment is the fact-interception device provided by the new
rules, and there is no longer a necessity for fact-interception at the plead-
ing stage as there was under prior practice.
Finally, defendant may press a motion for a more definite statement. 61
This motion, because of the waiver provision of rule 12 (g),'2 must be
included with the 12(b) (6) motion. If the court determines that the
complaint is lacking in specificity, it can then grant the motion for a
more definite statement 3 rather than the motion to dismiss and thus
avoid problems of dismissal and relation back and possible res judicata
consequences of dismissal while assuring that the defendant is provided
with the specificity to which he is entitled. This course is preferable
to dismissal, but still not always desirable because it will often violate the
function of the motion for a more definite statement. Assuming that the
defendant does not obtain all the facts that he would like from a complaint,
he can still use the provision in rule 8 (b) allowing denial without sufficient
knowledge 4 and thus avoid being faced with a complaint "so vague and
ambiguous" that he cannot respond.
The danger of the motion for a more definite statement under rule
12 (e) is that it will become, in effect, a bill of particulars and a dilatory
pleading. 5 If it is allowed to become a bill of particulars and plaintiff
cannot satisfy the order, then his pleading may be struck or other action
taken.16 The argument could then be made that plaintiff is not prejudiced
6 MooRE 56.03.N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e).
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(g) requires all motions, with a few exceptions, to be made
together; otherwise they are waived.
es N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e) refers to a compliant "so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading...."
" N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(b) allows defendant to answer that "he is without knowl-
edge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment...."
and states that this form of answer will be treated as a denial. See 2A Mooi
8.22.
" See Comment, The Revival of the Bill of Particulars under the Federal Civil
Rules, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1473 (1958) ; Comment, Federal Riles of Civil Procedure
-Federal Rifle 12(e): Motion for More Definite Statement-History, Operation
and Efficacy, 61 MIcHr. L. REv. 1126 (1963).
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(e). Cf. Lodge 743, International Ass'n of Machinists
v. United Aircraft Corp., 30 F.R.D. 142 (D. Conn. 1962). The court in this case
granted the 12(e) motion, but deferred plaintiff's addition to the pleading until
after plaintiff's discovery. The case seems wrongly decided.
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because he could have taken pre-complaint discovery and avoided the
entire problem. But pleading under the new rules would thus become a
mere extension of code practice. The only apparent method of avoiding
this result is for the court to grant the 12(e) motion only when it would
be granted in federal practice. An exception should be made for complaints
following North Carolina forms (3) and (4). When these forms are used,
the 12(e) motion should be granted in preference to a motion under
12(b) (6).
If a motion to dismiss is granted, there still exists the possibility of
amendment (and relation back) under rule 15." NCRCP 15 (a) allows
one amendment of right before service of the responsive pleading or, if
there is no responsive pleading, within thirty days of service of the plead-
ing to be amended.6" Even though a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading, 9 amendment of right is generally cut off when the motion is
granted.7" The dismissed party must then request leave to amend from
the court.71 The standard for granting leave to amend under NCRCP
15 (a) is that it shall be "freely given when justice so requires."
In any case in which a complaint is dismissed because it lacks spe-
cificity under NCRCP 8(a) (1), justice does require that leave be
granted; indeed, the federal courts interpret FRCP 15 (a) to require the
granting of leave to amend unless the plaintiff clearly can never amend to
plead any state of facts upon which, if proven, relief might be granted.72
Even with free amendment, however, the best solution is to give the re-
quirement of "notice" greater weight than the words "sufficiently par-
ticular" in new rule 8(a) (1). If this suggestion is followed, the complaint
would not be dismissed in the first instance, and plaintiff would not be put
to the uncertainty of requesting leave to amend and the expense of writing
and filing the amendment. Yet dismissal with leave to amend is still
preferable to the res judicata consequences of judgment of dismissal.
67 N.C.R. Civ. P. 15.
61 N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a).
" 3 MooRE 15.07(2).
"Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963); Cassell v.
Michaux, 240 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1956). But some cases hold that plaintiff may
amend as a matter of right after a motion to dismiss has been granted. E.g., Brieir
v. Northern Calif. Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, 316 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1963);
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, 292 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1961).
• Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The test is stated in Alexander
v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 314 F.2d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1963) to be whether




If, however, a complaint is dismissed and leave to amend denied, the
appellate courts should closely examine the trial judg&s reasons for the
denial7" to determine if he has abused his discretion.74 Only in this way
can the appellate courts truly chart the course of the new North Carolina
rules and insure that justice is done.
When plaintiff is granted leave to amend, the amendment will relate
back to the time of the filing of the original pleading if the amended com-
plaint gives "notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences... ." that are to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading." This phraseology is intentionally designed to avoid dis-
tinctions between pleading a new cause of action and amplifying an old
one.76 Thus, even if the complaint is dismissed, but leave to amend is
granted, plaintiff can amend with a new theory based on the same set of
historical facts, and the amended complaint will relate back. Since de-
fendant was already on notice from the first pleading as to what facts
that the plaintiff was claiming as a wrong, he should not be surprised
by the presentation of that same transaction or occurrence in a new
form.7 7
Since no reasons exist for not following the liberal precedent of the
federal and New York courts, except in situations involving negligent
operation of automobiles that are governed by specific forms in the new
rules and since there is no compelling purpose in requiring specificity in
pleading when other fact-interception and issue-formulation devices are
provided, NCRCP 8(a) (1) should be interpreted to require no more
specificity than FRCP 8(a) (2). Similarly, motions under 12(b) (6)
should be granted in the same circumstances as they are in the federal
"' North Carolina trial judges will be required to articulate reasons for refusing
leave to amend under the amendment to N.C.R. Civ. P. 52(a). Ch. 895, § 12,
[1969] N.C. Sess. L. -.
"' Under North Carolina Code practice a trial judge has never been found to
have abused his discretion in denying leave to amend. Louis, The Sufficiency of a
Complaint, Res .udicata and the Statute of Limitations-A Study Occasioned by
Recent Changes in the North Carolina Code, 45 N.C.L. REv. 659, 674 & nn.83-84
(1967). The federal trial courts are closely regulated by the appellate courts on
this point. The Supreme Court has stated:
Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the
discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave
without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise
of discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion ....
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
"N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(c).
"Id., comment (c).
"Id.; see also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9 (1965).
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courts. If, however, the courts of North Carolina determine that greater
specificity is required by NCRCP 8(a) (1) than by FRCP 8(a) (2), the
use of the 12(e) motion in place of the one under 12(b) (6) and the
liberal allowance of amendments are recommended as methods of insuring
a balanced and equitable system.
ROGER GROOT
Constitutional Law-Illegality of Police Program To Gather
Information on Civil Disorders
In Anderson v. Sills1 a New Jersey Superior Court held that a state-
sponsored program of information-gathering about civil disorders and
the participating groups and individuals was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the plaintiffs' rights of free speech and assembly. The state
attorney general had ordered preparation of two forms for use by local
police departments.
One, the "Security Incident Report Form," was designed to gather
information on any "civil disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration,
march or confrontation," including "the names of organizations or groups
involved, leaders, and the type of organization. ' 2 The "Security Sum-
106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Super. Ct. 1969).
Id. at 548, 256 A.2d at 300. An excerpt from the report's "instructions for
preparation" illustrates its breadth:
9. TYPE OF INCIDENT-Enter the type of incident. EXAMPLES: Civil
disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march, confrontation, etc.
10. LOCATION-Type the location of the incident. If business or residence,
the number and name of street, road, lane or avenue. If open area, give
approximate distance to a known geographic location.
11. REASON OR PURPOSE OF INCIDENT-Enter reason for incident
or alleged purpose.
12. NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS-List estimated or announced number
of participants or anticipated participants.
13. ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR GROUPS INVOLVED-Give full
names and addresses of organizations and/or groups involved. If more
space is needed, use Narrative.
14. LEADERS-Enter names, addresses and titles, if any, of leaders of
organizations and/or groups involved. Include nicknames, aliases, and
other identifying data.
17. NARRATIVE
a. Information previously included elsewhere on this report need not be
repeated in the Narrative.
[Vol. 48
